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On Easter Monday 1978, Clemens Kapuuo, the paramount chief of the Ovaherero and
leader of the Democratie Turnhalle Alliance of Namibia, was shot and killed by unidentified
gunmen in Windhoek. Although it never claimed credit for the assassination, the South West
African People's Organisation (SWAPO) was blamed for the killing. Shortly thereafter, on
Ascension Day, the largest military Operation undertaken by South Africa since the Second
World War, Operation Reindeer, was launched. South African farces attacked targets deep
inside Angola and over 1,200 people were killed in a SWAPO camp that had been
established at Kassinga. As justification for Operation Reindeer, the South African govern-
ment referred to a number of incidents, of which the murder of Kapuuo was the most
important. Based on a wide variety of archival, oral, and printed sources, the article seeks
to situate the killing of Kapuuo. It traces the career of Kapuuo in conjunction with political
developments within Namibia between 1971 and 1978. It demonstrates that throughout his
political career, Clemens Kapuuo refused to compromise on a number of conditions
relating to the political future of Namibia. In conclusion, the article argues that it is
possible that Kapuuo was murdered by elements of the South African military intent on
strengthening their hold on Namibia and South Africa at the time.
In the late afternoon of Easter Monday, 27 March 1978, on a cloudy day in Katutura - the
apartheid township of the Namibian capital Windhoek - Clemens Kapuuo, the paramount
chief of the Herero, stood talking to friends and colleagues who had called on him before
commencing a journey. Wishing to talk to him freely, the party had stepped out of the back
door of his store for a confidential meeting. Suddenly two to six shots rang out and Kapuuo
collapsed into the arms of Gerson Hoveka, the Herero headman of Epukiro Reserve. Two
men were seen running away. The police were called, and Kapuuo was loaded onto the back
of a bakkie (pick-up) and driven to the Nie Blanke Staatshospitaal Katutura (Katutura
Non-White State Hospital). Dr A. M. E. Twomey declared that upon arrival Kapuuo was
clinically dead. A sodium bicarbonate and atropine drip was set up, heart massage was
applied, and adrenalin was injected directly into the heart. However, 'all these measures
were unsuccessful and resuscitation attempts were stopped after about 30 minutes'.1 In the
subsequent autopsy, carried out by Dr J. P. Nel, the cause of death was declared as
Skietwond deur Borskas met Bloedverlies (gunshot wound through the ehest cavity with
Woodloss).2 Unrest and inter-ethnic strife, which had been simmering in the weeks prior to
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Kapuuo's murder, now exploded. Katutura burned and, in the days that followed, houses,
cars and property were destroyed, people were killed, and hundreds were driven from their
homes.
The most important black political leader in Namibia had been killed. Yet, in the
months that followed, the South African armed forces never formally charged anyone with
the murder, although the official maxim was that SWAPO terrorists had murdered Kapuuo.
However, SWAPO, for its part, has never formally claimed that its operatives killed
Kapuuo.3 Anxious to know more, I was astonished to discover that no documents relating
to the assassination of Clemens Kapuuo were to be found in the Namibian National
Archives in Windhoek.4 Aware that an inquest had been conducted in the Windhoek
Magistrates' Court, I sought to find the papers there. Inquiries there indicated that the files
had been deposited with the archives, whilst the archives claimed never to have received
them. Finally, through talking to former employees I discovered that shortly before
Namibian independence in 1990, large amounts of documents had been deposited in two
garages at the back of the Magistrates' Court. After two days of 'key searching' I finally
managed to open one of the garages; this was stacked to the roof with documents relating
to civil cases, homicide cases and inquests, as well as a jumble of broken fans, benches and
chairs. Within half an hour, I was able to find the papers relating to the inquest of Clemens
Kapuuo.
This article has developed out of the papers I found then. At first I merely wanted to
discuss and describe Kapuuo and his assassination, but, as time passed, I became more and
more intrigued and surprised by the political developments around the time of Kapuuo's
killing. In the end, I have become convinced that what I had previously dismissed as mere
coincidence could be more. In researching Kapuuo's murder, I have gradually moved away
from suspecting people associated with SWAPO, towards believing that one of the myriad
of South African government 'dirty tricks' departments was involved.5
There have been numerous assassinations in Southern and central Africa and these
continue to engender debate and discussion. The deaths of Patrice Lumumba, Samora
Machel, Chris Hani and others have failed to put an end to the often controversial political
lives of these people.6 Every now and again, gusts of speculation and discussion breathe life
into the glowing embers of the memory of people long gone. The memories of their deaths
will be resurrected and refashioned to suit the political struggles of the day. In a
sub-continent where much of the evidence regarding the 'dirty wars' remains hidden or has
been destroyed, the absence of clear and unambiguous material and evidence will ensure
that speculation will continue for many years to come. This is well illustrated in the recent
work of Luise White, who has written an excellent book about the assassination of the
Similarly, it could be argued, SWAPO has never admitted to killing people detained by the Organisation. For
a discussion on the media campaign waged in Namibia in 1978 see, A. Heywood, The Cassinga Event, second
revised edition (Windhoek, National Archives of Namibia, 1996), pp. 78-101.
By way of comparison, this would be a little like being unable to find documents relating to the murders of
Hans Martin Schleyer (18 October 1977) or Earl Mountbatten of Burma (27 August 1979).
This is not to deny that SWAPO was involved in human rights abuses and murder. In exile, hundreds of
SWAPO dependants and members were detained, tortured and killed without trial. Currently, the Namibian
National Society for Human Rights, church organisations, and the 'Breaking the Wall of Silence' committee
of ex-detainees continue to seek recognition and clarification regarding the deaths and disappearances of
detainees in SWAPO custody. Evidence has come to the fore that directly impltcates many within the current
Namibian elite in human rights abuses committed during the 1980s. Implicated are, amongst others, the
'Butcher of Lubango', the current Chief of the Namibian Defence Force, Major General Solomon Dumem
'Jesus' Hawala. Those seeking a detailed introduction to these events are referred to, S. Groth, Namibia The
Wall of Silence: The Dark Days of the Liberation Struggle (Wuppertal, Peter Hammer Verlag, 1995).
A. de Villiers Minnaar, I. Liebenberg and C. Schutte (eds) The Hidden Hand: Covert Opemtions in South
Africa (Pretoria, Human Sciences Research Council, 1994); J. Brassine and J. Kestergat, Qui a Tué Patrice
Lumumba? (Paris, Duculot, 1991); Y. Bénot, La Mort de Lumumba (Paris, Chaka, 1989); AIM, Samora, Wfty
He Died (Maputo, AIM, Mozambique News Agency, 1986).
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Zimbabwean nationalist leader, Herbert Chitepo.7 In her work, White has followed the
twists and turns of evidence and counter-evidence in relation to Chitepo's murder. In the
end, White's work is not about discovering who did the deed; instead it seeks to discover
what lies behind the charges and confessions made in relation to Chitepo's death. In
contrast, I have written this article as part of an attempt to find out more about my past.
Who was Kapuuo?
Clemens Matuurunge Kapuuo was born on 16 March 1923, the year in which Samuel
Maharero died in exile in Serowe, Bechuanaland Protectorate. Kapuuo was born at
Teufelsbach in the district of Okahandja, the son of Onangandji Alexandrine Kandirikira
and Clemens Kapuuo Snr, who became a wealthy and prominent trader and influential
politician in Windhoek in the inter-war period. Apart from being related to Samuel
Maharero through his matri-clan, Kandikirira, he was also the nephew of the first Namibian
nationalist leader, Chief Hosea Kutako, Samuel Maharero's chosen representative in
Namibia.
Kapuuo senior owned several shops in Windhoek location and served on the location
advisory board and his son grew up in a household and surroundings that continuously dealt
in, and discussed politics. Like many of Namibia's other early nationalists, Clemens
Kapuuo attended St Barnabas College in Windhoek, after which hè qualified as a teacher
at the Stoffberg Training College in the Orange Free State in South Africa.8 After teaching
at Waterberg, the site of the Herero defeat in the Herero-German war, Kapuuo taught at
Karibib and at his alma mater, St Barnabas.
Kapuuo was active in opposing the move, under the apartheid Group Areas Act, of the
old location to Katatura, situated eight kilometres away. In this Opposition Kapuuo
co-operated with the present President of Namibia, Sam Nujoma. Opposition to the move,
which included bus boycotts and a boycott of the municipal Beer Hall, culminated in a
demonstration in which at least 11 people were shot and killed and many more injured by
police on 10 December 1959. In the aftermam of the shooting, many people fled the
location, fearing further violence, and the move to Katutura continued. However, in the end
people were forced to move following the shooting of 10 December 1959. The last houses
in the old location were forcibly cleared in August 1968. In the process, St Barnabas was
also destroyed.9
Even though hè understood the colonial languages of English, German and Afrikaans,
Hosea Kutako, leader of the Herero in Namibia who had petitioned South Africa at the
United Nations, used Clemens Kapuuo as his interpreter in all of his dealings with the press
and South African officials.10 One such journalist noted of a meeting held in 1956:
7 L. White, The Assassination of Herben Chitepo: Texts and Politics in Zimbabwe (Bloomington and
Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 2003).
8 On the role of St Barnabas see, T. Emmett, Populär Resistance and the Roots of Nationalism in Namibia,
1915-1966 (Basel, Schlettwein Publishing, 1999), p. 280. Unfortunately St Barnabas was closed by the South
African authorities following the introduction of Bantu education.
9 For further information on the Old Location and the subsequent move to Katutura see, D. Ridgway, An
Investigation of the Shooting at the Old Location on 10 December 1959 (Windhoek, Archeia, 1991); W. C.
Pendleton, Katutura: A Place Where We Do Not Stay (San Diego State University Press, 1974); C. von Garnier
(ed.), Katutura Revisited 1986: Essays on a Black Namibian Apartheid Suburb (Windhoek, Social Sciences
Research Centre, Roman Catholic Church, 1986).
10 Unfortunately, as yet, no published biography of Hosea Kutako is available. The matrilineal relative of the
paramount chief Samuel Maharero; wounded in the Herero-German war; installed as headman in the
Windhoek location after the South African Invasion of Namibia; appointed by Samuel Maharero as regent in
1921; one of the first nationalist leaders of Namibia, he died in 1970.
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My meeting with Chief Kutako took place in the poor shade of a thorn tree close to bis home
and Clemens Kapuuo was on hand to act as interpreten I was immediately struck by his
forceful facility in interpreting in English and Afrikaans my questions to his Chief and the
answers. Where the Chief's voice lacked strength because of his age - he was then in his
seventies - Clemens Kapuuo gave particular emphasis to his Chief s words by his penetratingly
clear and unsmiling interpretations. I had a suspicion that the Interpreter was amplifying and
overstressing the answers his Chief was giving me. That left me with the strong impression that
the power behind the throne was Clemens Kapuuo."
Thus, while Clemens Kapuuo and Rev. B. G. Karuaera acted as Kutako's secretaries and
repräsentatives, in the end, however, it was Kapuuo who was appointed by Kutako as his
successor in 1960 and when Kutako died in July 1970, Kapuuo succeeded him.12
Clemens Kapuuo - secretary and confidante of the highly respected Chief Hosea Kutako
- had been chosen to succeed Kutako, not only as chief of the Herero and representative
of the house of Maharero, but also as a chief who would continue the tradition of struggle
and Opposition to South African rule that had been established by Hosea Kutako. During
his long and complex life and his rule as chief of the Herero, Hosea had consistently sought
to regain Herero, and later Namibian, rights to self-determination. Hosea Kutako died in
1970, a symbol of nationalist resistance to South African rule. Indeed, after the indepen-
dence of Namibia, Windhoek's international airport, which until then had been named in
honour of South Africa's second apartheid era Prime Minister, J. G. Strydom, was renamed
in honour of Hosea Kutako, as was Republiekweg, a major thoroughfare in Windhoek.13
With the death of Kutako and the installation of Kapuuo, it was expected that Kapuuo
would maintain Kutako's position of consistent Opposition to South African rule.
The First Years of Kapuuo's Rule
During the first years of Clemens Kapuuo's rule as chief of the Herero hè appeared to be
following in the footsteps of his illustrious predecessor. However, there is no doubt that
Kapuuo's style of leadership was different to that of Kutako. While Kutako favoured
consensus politics and would allow meetings and discussions to carry on until consensus
was reached, Kapuuo was a more forceful leader, and was not above cutting discussion
short before consensus had been reached.14 Yet, in terms of policy, Kapuuo followed
Kutako's example. The Herero-German war of 1904-1908 had brought about the destruc-
tion of Herero society, the loss of all its land, stock and goods, and the death of no less than
80 per cent of its population.15 As the son and representative of people who had experienced
the füll devastation of war, Kapuuo followed Kutako and opposed all calls to arms. Kapuuo
knew füll well what war had brought to the Herero of central Namibia.
In 1971, the year after Kutako's death, Kapuuo was elected head of the National
Convention, a loose alliance of political parties united in their Opposition to South African
11 D. Friedmann, 'Tributes to Clemens Mutuurunge Kapuuo 1923-1978', in SWA Annual 1979, p. 33.
12 Succession in Herero society, as in all societies, is bound to all manner of conventions, many of which come
to be broken in the interests of power politics and pragmatism. Since the 1870s many anthropologists have
sought to unravel the intricacies of Herero succession. E. Dannert, Zum Rechte der Herero Insbesondere Ober
Ihr Familien - und Erbrecht (Berlin, Dietrich Reimer, 1906) and D. Gibson, The Social Organisation of the
Southwestern Bantu (Unpublished D. Phil thesis, University of Chicago, 1952).
13 In 1999, a statue of Kutako was placed facing the buildings housing Namibia's parliament. Sadly, even though
the statue had been placed there it remained wrapped in black plastic tbr no less than eighteen months until
two other busts, considered to be representative of the Nama and Ovambo populations of Namibia, had been
placed alongside it.
14 Indeed, the split that re-developed between Banderu and Herero proper after 1970 has been attributed to
Kapuuo. For a discussion on Kapuuo's leadership style in contrast to that of Kutako see, K. Dahlmann, 'Das
Erbe Clemens Kapuuo', in Allgemeine Zeitung, 10 April 1978.
15 J.-B. Gewald, Herero Heroes: A Socio-Political History of the Herero of Namibia, 1890-1923 (Oxford, James
Currey, 1999), pp. 141-230.
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rule. The convention included SWAPO, NUDO (National Unity Democratie Organisation,
led by Kapuuo), SWANU (South West African National Union, led by the Maoist, Gerson
Vei Hitjevi), Volksparty of Rehoboth, Voice of the People, and other groups.16 In the same
year, Namibia was wracked by major industrial action. In the clampdown that followed,
numerous people were detained and Clemens Kapuuo was fired from his position as a
teacher on account of his political involvement and vocal Opposition to South African rule.17
In the wake of the clampdown, thousands of young men fled into exile and the guerrilla
war, initiated by SWAPO against South African rule, expanded. A state of emergency was
declared in the northern parts of Namibia in 1972, and the following year the South African
Defence Force took over the task of counter-insurgency in Namibia.18
Riding the Tiger
Yet within a few years, Kapuuo's role as a symbol of anti-colonial resistance would be
thrown into doubt, when in 1975 hè announced that hè would be participating in the South
African-sponsored Turnhalle Conference. The conference, held between South African
government representatives and representatives of the South African appointed 'tribal
Authorities', was to draft an ethnically-based constitution for the territory. In the run-up to
the talks, Namibian churches expressed the Opposition feit by many when they resolved
that, 'these talks were unilaterally organised and planned by the South African government
and were looked upon by the majority as unwanted and unjust'.19 The words of the
renowned Namibian political scientist, Andre du Pisani, clearly expresses the confusion feit
by many regarding political developments in Namibia in 1975:
For most local observers Clemens Kapuuo's decision to participate in the Turnhalle consti-
tutional conference came as a surprise, for here was a man openly opposed to South Africa's
policies of ethnic fragmentation in Namibia. Furthermore hè had gone so far as to petition
South Africa at the United Nations, and had previously rejected the Prime Minister's Advisory
Council (the institutional predecessor of the constitutional conference) on the grounds that
South Africa had no right to establish such a body.20
How was it that a man renowned for his consistent Opposition to South African rule
suddenly chose to associate and co-operate with the South Africans? I believe that the
answer lies in the issue of land. In 1962, the South African administration appointed the
Odendaal Commission, of which it has been noted that:
The recommendations made by the Commission had little to do with promoting the welfare of
black Namibians. Instead, they mirrored a desire to entrench territorial apartheid in Namibia.21
In terms of the Commission's report, the existing 'Native Reserves' were to be redesigned
on a completely ethnic basis. 'Self-government' on the basis of these ethnic 'homelands'
was to be the ultimate political objective.22 In terms of the report, the Aminuis Reserve, an
16 For further Information leading to the formation of the National Convention see, T. R. H. Davenport, South
Africa: A Modern History, Third edition (Johannesburg, Macmillan, 1987), p. 484; K. Dierks, Chronology of
Namibian History: From Pre-historical Times to Independent Namibia (Windhoek, Namibia Scientific Society,
1999), pp. 136-137; and D. Herbstein and J. Evenson, The Devils are Among Us: The War for Namibia
(London, Zed Books, 1989), p. 38.
17 Herbstein and Evenson, The Devils are Among Us, p. 39.
18 Colonel C. J. Nöthling, 'Military Chronicle of South West Africa (1915-1988)', in South African Defence
Force Review, 1989.
19 'More Warnings on Talks', Windhoek Advertiser, Tuesday, 19 August 1975.
20 A. du Pisani, SWA/Namibia: The Politics of Continuity and Change (Johannesburg, Jonathan Ball, 1985),
p. 286.
21 F. Adams, W. Werner and P. Vale, The Land Issue in Namibia: An Inquiry (Windhoek, NEPRU, 1990), p. 91.
22 Regarding reserves and reserves policy in Namibia see, W. Werner, 'No One Will Become Rieh': Economy and
Society in the Herero Reserves in Namibia, 1915-1946 (Basel, Schlettwein Publishing, 1998), and 'A Brief
History of Land Dispossession in Namibia', in Journal of Southern African Studies, 19, l (March 1993),
pp. 135-146.
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ethnically mixed reserve, formed the basis of a future, still to be established Tswana
homeland. It would thus have to be cleared of all inhabitants not deemed to be Tswana. In
other words, the Herero living there would have to leave the reserve and resettle in Epukiro
Reserve, the envisaged basis for a Herero 'homeland' (Hereroland), which would lie 200
kilometres to the North.23
Aminuis Reserve and the lands associated with it were, and still are, of paramount
importance to the Herero. In the 1920s, when the Herero had been forced off the central
Namibian highlands, Aminuis Reserve was one of two major reserves in which the Herero
were re-settled. Aminuis Reserve, more importantly Taosis, was the site of Hosea Kutako's
settlement.24 In terms of the report of the Odendaal Commission, the Herero would have to
leave Aminuis. For the Herero this would mean further loss of land, an aspect that is of
central importance to Herero society.
Thus it was that land, and more specifically the Aminuis Reserve, was to be the factor
that ensured Kapuuo's willingness to begin co-operating with the South African administra-
tion. In 1974, after intensive lobbying on the part of Kapuuo and nis followers, the South
African government announced that it would no longer be pursuing the creation of a
Tswana homeland in the Aminuis area.25 By implication, the Herero living in Aminuis no
longer faced the threat of forced removals. Kapuuo's intensive talks with the South African
authorities in connection with Aminuis coincided with the decision of SWAPO to withdraw
its support from the National Convention. In withdrawing from the convention, SWAPO
lashed out at Kapuuo, who, for his part, emphasised the importance of land. Referring back
to the wars waged by the Herero and Nama against German colonial rule and the loss of
their lands, goods, and people in the early twentieth Century, Kapuuo argued that:26
The Ovambos, who are today represented by SWAPO ... did not take part in a war against the
Germans...
South Africa did not deprive the Ovambos of their lands. ... for the tribes of central and
southern parts of South West Africa who have suffered terribly for more than 70 years under
German and South African governments, this land and their rights are very dear to them, and
they cannot and will never allow their lands and their future to be decided by a political
Organisation of just one tribe which was not elected by them.27
In 1975, when the South African administration established a constitutional conference with
delegates called from 'each tribe', SWAPO refused to participate, yet Clemens Kapuuo, as
23 Republic of South Africa, Report of the Commission of Enquiry into South West Africa Affairs I962-1963, R.
P. Np. 12/1964. p. 111.
24 Aminuis Reserve currently appears to be an area of singular ritual importance to Herero society. Herero leaders
wishing to gain social recognition will travel to Aminuis and visit the Ondangere [a highly respected person
who communicates with the ancestors] living there. Recently Chief Riruako has moved to Aminuis and set up
a cattle post there. J-B. Gewald, 'We thought we would befree': Ideals and Realities in the 1920s, (unpublished
paper presented at 'People, Cattle and Land: A Symposium on the Culture, History and Economy of Otjiherero
Speaking People', Michaelsberg, Siegburg, September 1997); Heaven on Earth: Herero Conceptualisation of
Land 1920-1940, (unpublished paper presented at 'Landnahme: Zur Historischen und Symbolischen Aneigung
Lokaler Räume' Cologne, October 1998); and 'We Thought We Would be Free': Aspects in the Socio-Cultural
History of the Herero of Namibia 1920-1940 (Cologne, Rüdiger Koppe Verlag, 2000), chapter 2.
25 Du Pisani, SWA/Namibia, p. 286.
26 For further information regarding the wars waged by the Herero and Nama against German colonisation see,
H. Bley, South West Africa under German Rule, 1894-1914 (Hamburg, Lit Verlag, 1996); H. Drechsler, 'Let
us Die Fighting': The Struggle of the Herero and Nama against German Imperialism (1884-1915) (London,
Zed Press, 1980) and J-B. Gewald, Herero Heroes.
27 Herbstein and Evenson, Devils Among Us, p. 39. Kapuuo was referring to the fact that most of the Ovambo
lands lay outside the German Police Zone and therefore dispossession akin to that suffered by the groups
further south, who had fought against colonisation, had not occurred. Interestingly Kapuuo's words of 1975,
mirror those of his successor Kuaima Riruako 25 years later, 'Ons Sal Vergewe Maar Nie Vergeet Nie', Die
Republikein, 29 August 2000.
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representative of the Herero was present. Kozonguizi, who had gone into exile in the early
1960s and had broadcast tirades on Radio Peking accusing SWAPO of having adopted a
'reformist approach', accompanied Kapuuo as his legal adviser.28 Commenting on nis
involvement in the Turnhalle Conference, Kapuuo stated:
that his first priority was to consolidate the Herero position, and then to bargain for a
reallocation of economie resources, notably land.29
It would appear that Kapuuo, who consistently opposed the armed struggle, believed that
hè could 'ride the tiger' and gain the benefits that hè believed his followers needed. Indeed,
in May 1977, when the Chief Native Commissioner for Namibia, Mr Strauss, called a
meeting with Kapuuo to discuss the formation of a Herero legislative assembly, similar to
those that already existed in Owambo, Kavango and Caprivi, Kapuuo refused to altend on
the grounds that he did not want to be involved in the creation of a 'Bantustan'.30
The Political Climate in South Africa and Namibia, March 1978
In early 1978, at the time of Kapuuo's murder, it is safe to say that the apartheid
government of B. J. Vorster was under pressure. The Soweto student uprising of 1976, the
collapse of Vorster's vaunted policy of détente with Africa, the independence of the
Portuguese colonies, Angola and Mozambique, along with the presence of Andrew Young
as the Carter administration's ambassador at the United Nations, all served to bring pressure
to bear upon Vorster's regime.31
That government, which was centred upon a power base within the highly politicised
South African Police force, and its off-shoot (Vorster's own creation), the Bureau of State
Security, demonstrated a clear lack of vision, beyond that of brute violence, when it came
to dealing with Opposition to its rule. The callous killing of Steve Biko in 1977, coupled
with the continued unrest in South Africa, showed up the inability of the South African
security apparatus to control and contain dissatisfaction within the black community.32
Effectively, Vorster was unable to control the South African Situation and lacked the later
vision and ideology characteristic of Botha and his securocrats.33
In early 1978, at the time of Kapuuo's murder, P. W. Botha was the South African
Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan was Chief of the SADF, General Constand
Viljoen was Chief of the Army, Major-General Jannie Geldenhuys was the commanding
officer of the South West Africa Command, and General Kat Liebenberg was commander
of the South African forces in Sector 10, Namibia.34
Following Angolan independence in 1975, SWAPO moved its headquarters from Dar
es Salaam in Tanzania to Luanda in Angola. In 1975, South African armed forces invaded
28 Herbstein and Evenson, Devils Among Us, p. 24. Interestingly, in the early 1960s Kozonguizi had broadcast
anti-imperialist propaganda from Radio Peking and had accused SWAPO of adopting a 'reformist approach',
p. 9.
29 Du Pisani, SWA/Namibia, p. 286.
30 Ibid., p. 360.
31 Davenport, South Africa, Chapter 16. Du Pisani, SWA/Namibia, p. 380 deals with the Dakar conference on
Namibia and Human Rights, which firmly rejected détente.
32 On South Africa and Vorster, it is well worth reading Donald Woods, Biko (New York, Henry Holt, 1987).
33 On the vision and ideology of Botha and his securocrats see, P. Frankel, N. Pines, and M. Swilling (eds), State
Resistance and Change in South Africa (London, Croom Helm, 1988).
34 Liebenberg would later become commander of special forces and involved in the covert propaganda campaign
of the South African government in Namibia during the Namibian independence elections. S. Ellis, Journal of
Southern African Studies, 24, 2 (1998), p. 283.
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Angola with the covert support of the CIA. Operation Savannah, as the Invasion was
named, was carried out without the South African cabinet, let alone parliament, being
informed.35 However, sections of the Broederbond were informed (most notably its
chairman, Gerrit Viljoen, who later became the South African Administrator-General for
Namibia). Closer to home, SWAPO, or more specifically its military wing, PLAN (People's
Liberation Army of Namibia), stepped up its military campaign against the illegal South
African occupation of Namibia. Following Angolan independence, PLAN launched annual
'invasions' of between 500 to 1,500 soldiers. Although these incursions were inevitably
driven off by SADF actions, they did ensure continuing populär support for SWAPO.
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3111, of December 1973, declared SWAPO
'the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people'. One unfortunate consequence
of this resolution was that many Namibians in exile, most notably SWANU members, found
themselves ostracised, forced into joining SWAPO, deported or detained. The indications
are that South African agents had infiltrated SWANU members in exile and were
instrumental in encouraging them to return to Namibia. In the event, many Namibians who
had gone into exile in the early 1960s now began returning to Namibia. One such person
was V. Mbaeva, a lecturer at CUNY in New York, who returned to Namibia from exile in
the hope of becoming 'Bantu Commissioner' at 'Rietfontein Block' in the Herero Reserve.36
Another returnee was Kozonguizi, who became Kapuuo's legal adviser in the consti-
tutional conference that became known as the Turnhalle Conference. In response to the
Turnhalle Conference, the United Nations reiterated its continuing Opposition to the South
African occupation of Namibia. UN resolution 385 of 1976 once again revoked South
Africa's rights to administer Namibia and led to the establishment of the 'Western Five'
Contact Group, comprising Britain, France, West Germany, Canada and the US. In early
1977, the Conference submitted a 'final concept' for the establishment of an interim
government and a plan to create three layers of administration under which the country
would proceed to independence. However, many in Namibia as well as the outside world
rejected Turnhalle because it was structured on an ethnic basis, particularly at the second
and third levels of government, where the basic territorial divisions outlined in the Odendaal
Report were to apply.37
As the Turnhalle Conference progressed, large sections of the Namibian population
continued to declare their allegiance to SWAPO. Thus, in 1976, a major section of the
country's Nama population, under the leadership of Rev. Hendrik Witbooi (grandson of the
great anti-colonial leader Hendrik Witbooi), declared allegiance to SWAPO. Similarly, in
1977, a major section of the Herero, most notably those allied to the royal house of
Maharero/Tjamuaha, publicly declared that they would have no further dealings with the
Turnhalle Conference, and that they supported SWAPO. Interestingly, at that stage, the
royal house of Maharero/Tjamuaha was being led by Rev. B. G. Karuaera - the man who,
along with Clemens Kapuuo, had been Hosea Kutako's personal secretary. Kapuuo, for his
part, formed an alliance with representatives of the eleven other ethnic parties participating
in the Turnhalle Conference and formed the Democratie Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) in
November 1977.38
35 As the report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) noted, 'Indeed, the issue (Operation
Savannah) was not even raised at cabinet level until the invasion was several months old and no longer a
secret', C. Villa-Vicencia and S. de Villiers (eds) The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa
Report (hereafter TRC), volume 2, chapters 2 § 13 (Cape Town, CTP Book Printers, 1998).
36 Allgemeine Zeitung, 'Beinahe ein Schwarzer Bantu-Kommissar', 17 November 1976, p. 1.
37 Davenport, South Africa, p. 486.
38 J. Pütz, H. von Egidy and P. Caplan, Namibia Handbook and Political Who's Who: Post-Election Edition
(Windhoek, Magus Company, 1990), pp. 66-69.
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The Killing of Kapuuo
In early February 1978, Clemens Kapuuo attended a DTA rally in the settlement of Okahao
in northern Namibia. During the proceedings, Toivo Shiyagaya, Health Minister in the
South African-administered local government of Ovamboland, was shot and killed by a
single gunman who jumped onto the stage. The gunman, who was immediately killed by
members of the Ovambo home guard, a SADF-sponsored paramilitary Organisation, was
later identified as Mathias Mauni and described as a 'SWAPO terrorist'.39 Towards the end
of February 1978, unrest broke out in Katutura. The conflict degenerated into a series of
clashes that appeared to follow ethnic divisions.40 The newspapers of the time describe the
clashes as being between the DTA and SWAPO, or 'SWAPO en Herero', where SWAPO
came to be equated with Ovambo.41 The unrest culminated in the killing of Julius
Kambirongo (an aide of Clemens Kapuuo), whose throat was slit and who was then battered
to death, after hè had opened fire on a crowd of SWAPO supporters.42 The unrest died down
after church leaders initiated talks between SWAPO, DTA, and other community represen-
tatives. Three weeks later, on the evening of Easter Monday 1978, Clemens Kapuuo was
gunned down.
The materials contained within the inquest docket for Kapuuo indicate that the
assassination of Kapuuo was meticulously planned and carried out. Kapuuo was shot by two
men who fired between two and six bullets in total. The newspapers at the time claimed that
the shots had been fired from a Tokarev pistol, implying SWAPO involvement, but no
mention was made of this in the inquest. Instead, the calibre of one of the recovered bullet
casings is given as 7.62 mm. The autopsy, conducted by the state pathologist Dr J. P. Nel,
indicates that soft-nosed dum-dum bullets were used. Dum-dum bullets leave small entry
holes and 'mushroom' or explode as they pass through the body. In the case of Kapuuo,
hè was hit by a bullet which entered just below his left shoulder blade and ripped through
the lower part of his left lung, tore through his aorta, oesophagus, and trachea. The bullet
then cut through the upper half of his right lung before exiting the body. The lower part
of Kapuuo's back was covered by the fragments of a second bullet that had disintegrated
before impact.
The actual assassination seems to have been carried out by a team of four men driving
a blue Chevrolet custom pick-up with Windhoek registration plates and black wrought iron
railings attached to the loading bed. The truck was parked some distance from the street in
which Kapuuo's store was located. The car turned and stopped, three of the men got out
to urinate, then two walked off and the remaining man re-joined the driver in the cab of
the truck. After about half an hour, it was reported that the two men came running back and
jumped onto the back of the Chevrolet, which by that stage was already rolling down the
street with its engine running. The Chevrolet and the hit team disappeared, never to be seen
again.
SWAPO Blamed by the Media
Immediately after Kapuuo's assassination, the media and the South African authorities
blamed SWAPO for the killing. A report carried in the Windhoek Advertiser, a Windhoek
newspaper, the day after the assassination noted:
39 Allgemeine Zeitung, 28 March 1978.
40 In the run-up to the forced removal of the mhabitants of the old location to Katutura, Dr Oswin Köhler, later
to become the founding professor of African Studies at the University of Cologne, designed a street-plan tbr
the new settlement, and divided the settlement up according to ethnic lines. A copy of the map is to be found
in the cartographers' office at the Institute for African Studies in Cologne.
41 Die Suidwester, l March 1978; 6 March 1978; and 7 March 1978.
42 The Windhoek Advertiser, 6 March 1978; 7 March 1978; 8 March 1978; 9 March 1978; and 10 March 1978.
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The Advertiser's night staff was probably the first to learn of the shooting. About 15 minutes
after the assassination, a telephone call was received to say that Mr. Kapuuo had been
murdered. We at first took the story to be a hoax, but a quick check proved it true. At that stage,
the Divisional Commissioner of Police, Brigadier H. V. Verster, made a brief statement in
which hè confirmed the attack on Mr. Kapuuo, Brigadier Verster was conspicuously angry and
made a few strong derogatory remarks about the SWAPO movement which hè blamed for the
The German language newspaper, Allgemeine Zeitung, also blamed SWAPO and described
Kapuuo as the third sacrificial victim [opfer] after the earlier killings of Chief Elifas in
August 1975 and Toivo Shiyagaya in February 1976.44 The following day, the newspaper
claimed that Kapuuo had been shot with a Tokarev pistol, and reported that South Africa's
Foreign Minister, Roelof 'Pik' Botha, as well as troop reinforcements, had been flown in
to Namibia from South Africa.45 The Afrikaans language newspaper, Die Suidwester, cited
Brigadier Verster and quoted him as saying, '[I]t is logical that the assassins (sluipmoorde-
naars) could be SWAPO terrorists from the north of South West' ,46 In addition, Allgemeine
Zeitung reported that on account of the cartridges found at the scène of the killing it had
been concluded that a Tokarev pistol had been used.47
Given the mindset that existed in Namibia at the time, what Verster and the newspapers
said indicated that the signs clearly identified the killers of Clemens Kapuuo as SWAPO
'terrorists' who had come from the north armed with Tokarev pistols - weapons produced
in the Soviet Union. Witness reports collected by the police in the days following Kapuuo's
assassination identified the killers as either Ovambo or SWAPO guerrillas. As one of the
witnesses stated, 'I know Ovambos'.48 While another witness stated, 'Given that the
deceased was headman of the Herero people, I suspect that the deceased was shot by Swapo
, 4Q
terrorists .
The Aftermath
Almost immediately after news of Kapuuo's death became known, ethnic clashes broke out
in Katutura. Riot police, who had been flown into Windhoek earlier on in the month,
and armed gangs of Herero and SWAPO militants clashed with one another in a spiral
of violence.50 Informants living in the area of Kapuuo's shop remember the time as
one of teargas and fear, with most residents seeking shelter in their houses for days on
end.51
With the killing of Kapuuo, and the widespread belief that hè had been killed by
SWAPO (and thus Ovambo) guerrillas, the war in Namibia became highly ethnicised. The
war in Namibia was represented in simple terms that placed southern and central Namibia
in Opposition to Ovamboland, and the DTA against SWAPO. The united urban Opposition
43 The Windhoek Adverhser, 28 March 1978.
44 Allgemeine Zeitung, 28 March 1978.
45 Allgemeine Zeitung, 29 March 1978. The murder weapon was not recovered, and the inquest makes no mention
of the possible make of the gun used.
46 '[D]is Logies dat die Sluipmoordenaars Swapo Terroriste uit die Noorde van Suidwes kan Wees.', Die
Suidwester, 28 March 1978.
47 Die Suidwester, 28 March 1978.
48 Inquest, the evidence of Berta Philander.
49 Inquest, the evidence of Ebson Kaapama.
50 At the time of Kapuuo's shooting I was a pupil at one of Windhoek's schools. An image remains with me from
that time of camouflaged police Land Rovers careening down Bahnhofstrasse on their way to Katutura. In the
back of these vehicles were policemen in riot gear carrying piek handles.
51 Interviews conducted in August 1999.
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to South African rule, which had existed so strongly in the Old Location, and had to some
extent continued to exist in Katutura, was broken. Henceforth, it became well nigh
impossible for people to enter parts of Katutura. Whole sections of the township had
effectively become no-go zones.52 The ethnic Separation so keenly sought by apartheid
planners was achieved overnight. From this time on, young Ovambo men would have been
courting death if they were to venture alone into those areas of Katutura that were zoned
for Herero occupancy. Many young men simply disappeared, their mutilated bodies found
later in the vicinity of Goreangab dam.53
Henceforth, the Herero turned their backs en masse on SWAPO. Whereas in the past
there had been attempts at forming a united front against South African occupation, the
killing of Kapuuo effectively ended this.54 Whilst conducting research amongst Herero
living in Botswana, anthropologist Kirsten Alnaes noted the following:
...the belief that SWAPO had killed chief Kapuuo. (...) At this time I was told: 'SWAPO is
our enemy, they kill our people. SWAPO killed our chief. SWAPO take our children to take
them to the boers to kill them'.55
There have been unconfirmed rumours that, as of September 1977, when Rev. Karuera
declared his support for SWAPO, Clemens Kapuuo had initiated talks with the SWAPO
leadership. However, it is more likely that talks between SWAPO and Kapuuo took place
in November 1977, when Kapuuo travelled to the United States to lobby members of the
OAU at the UN.56 In an interview conducted shortly after the death of Kapuuo, Emil
Appolus, one of the founding members of the Ovamboland People's Organisation, which
later became SWAPO, reiterated Kapuuo's standing as a true nationalist.57
The Democratie Turnhalle Alliance, the party to which Kapuuo had been elected as
president, was extensively funded by South African government 'slush fund' money.58 In
the aftermath of Kapuuo's killing the DTA did all in its power to 'milk' the incident for
what it was worth. The run-up to Kapuuo's funeral, as well as the funeral itself, was used
by the DTA as a continuous publicity campaign. Particularly pathetic was a photograph
placed in one of the Windhoek newspapers that showed three adolescent boys with bowed
heads at the grave of Chief Hosea Kutako in Okahandja, with the following caption:
At the grave of his predecessor, brown and white, Nama, Herero and Afrikaner position
themselves in silent tribute on either side of their Herero chum. These young members of the
DTA ... . in a strikingly quiet graveyard in the heart of South West.
On Sunday thousands of mourners are expected there to pay their last honours to Clemens
Kapuuo, leader of his people and - through his presidency of the alliance in which all eleven
population groups of the country are united - also leader of the whole of South West.59
Be that as it may, it is true to say that following the assassination of Kapuuo, the DTA
gained populär support, particularly amongst the Herero population of Namibia.
The assassination of Kapuuo also meant that the position of paramount chief of the
Herero feil vacant. This was taken by Kuaima Riruako, a man with an extremely
52 Interviews conducted in August 1999.
53 Interviews conducted in August 1999 and September 2000.
54 Du Pisani, SWA/Namibia, p. 153, on the formation of South West African National Liberation Front.
55 K. Alnaes, Report on the Political Climate Among Herero-Speakers in Botswana 1978-1979 and 1980,
unpublished report in author's possession.
56 Interview conducted in Windhoek, May 2000.
57 Die Republikein, 31 March 1978.
58 In operations Heyday and Victor, the DTA continued to receive South African slush money even after
Namibian independence in 1990. TRC, volume 2, chapter 2, 'The State Outside South Africa Between 1960
and 1990', §132-136.
59 Die Republikein, l April 1978 (author's translation).
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convoluted past. In the early 1960s Riruako had gone into exile, living in Botswana,
Zambia, Ethiopia and Ghana. After the coup in Ghana he was deported to Zambia, which
in turn deported him to South Africa. After a year of torture and solitary confinement in
Pretoria, Riruako was declared a prohibited immigrant and dumped on an island in the
Zambezi river, from which he was rescued by Zambian fishermen after three days. In 1969,
following the intercedence of an 'American development officer', Riruako received funding
from the African-American Institute which enabled him to travel to New York.60 In 1973,
Riruako was appointed NUDO's chief representative to the United Nations.61 In 1977,
Riruako addressed the United States Congress äs NUDO's representative. That same year,
Riruako came to enjoy the dubious distinction of being the first exile to return to Namibia
on a South African passport. At the time of Kapuuo's assassination, Riruako was in Paris,
which is also where hè was informed that hè was to become the new paramount chief of
the Herero. Riruako was inaugurated as paramount chief of the Herero in Toasis in the
Aminuis Reserve.62 The ceremony took place in a DTA tent, and DTA vehicles were used
to ferry attendants to and from the ceremony. At the same time, Riruako was elected as
president of NUDO.63 When internal elections were held in Namibia in November 1978, the
DTA, led by Chief Riruako, polled 41 of the 50 seats available.64
The assassination of Kapuuo was used by the South African administration to justify its
crackdown on SWAPO within Namibia. Indeed, SWAPO itself was never formally banned,
as had been the case with the ANC and PAC in South Africa; instead, the movement was
allowed to continue to exist although SWAPO activists were subject to continual harass-
ment and detention.65 As one South African official told Major Robert C. Owen of the
American air force:
... the so-called internal wing of SWAPO is even allowed to conduct 'legitimate' political
activities throughout Namibia to keep it out in the open, and to keep the faint-hearted from
going to Angola.66
Following Kapuuo's assassination, Axel Johannes, one of the most prominent SWAPO
activists in Namibia, was arrested and accused of the murder. The treatment of Johannes is
indicative of what happened to SWAPO activists around the country. At one stage hè was
taken to a river in the vicinity of Windhoek, hung from a tree, buried in sand, systematically
beaten and told to disclose the identity of Kapuuo's assassins and the whereabouts of the
murder weapon.67 Even though Johannes could prove that he was not in Windhoek at the
time of the murder, hè was tortured to such an extent that hè signed a prepared confession.
60 Regarding Riruako, Information can be found in 'Kuairna Riruako - Herero Leader', in S.W.A. Annual
(Windhoek, South West Africa Administration, 1979), p. 157, Pütz, Von Egidy and Caplan, Namibia
Handbook, pp. 201-202, and Du Pisani, SWA/Namibia.
61 It must be borne in mind that these appointments are merely paper tigers; they had no official legal standing
with the UN as such, and appear to be a ruse to lobby delegates from the UN.
62 Pütz et al, Namibia Handbook, pp. 201-202. 'Kuaima Riruako - Herero Leader', in S.W.A. Annual, p. 157.
Interviews conducted with Riruako, August 2000. Further research needs to be done on the life of Riruako in
exile. Simple questions such as who paid for his flights to and from Namibia and New York still remain
unanswered. It is likely that Riruako was approached by the South Africans in New York in the run-up to the
Turnhalle Conference, and that from at least 1976 onwards Riruako was living on South African money
channelled through NUDO in New York.
63 'Nuwe Leier Ingeseen vir die Hereros', 24 July 1978 and 'Nou Skyn die Lig Weer Vir Herero's', Die
Republikein, 28 July 1978.
64 Dierks, Chronology of Namibian History, p. 160.
65 Du Pisani, SWA/Namibia, p. 391; AG 26/1978 (18 April 1978).
66 R. C. Owen, Counterrevolution in Namibia, Air Chronicles Home Page. http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/
airchronicles/apj/apj87/owen.html.
67 Herbstein and Evenson, Devils Among Us, p. 35.
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Yet, 'No one was ever charged for this murder, though we know from Axel Johannes that
the police were desperate to assign responsibility to SWAPO which has always denied it'.68
Apart from cracking down on SWAPO within Namibia, the killing of Kapuuo
was also used to justify the escalation of the SADF's military presence in Namibia
and southern Angola. In early May 1978 Operation Reindeer was launched. This
consisted of a series of major cross-border raids against SWAPO camps in Angola.69 The
wider ramifications of this Operation are examined below. The South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission has summed up the impact of these raids as follows:
Some l 200 people - South West African, Angolan, Cuban and South African - died; over 600
others, overwhelmingly South West African and Angolan, were wounded in the attacks on
Kassinga and Chetequera that day. It is probable that sonie died later from their wounds. In
addition, several hundred were captured at Chetequera. No prisoners, or perhaps at most a
handful, were taken from Kassinga.69
At a press conference in Windhoek, Major-General Jannie Geldenhuys, the Commanding
Officer of the South West Africa Command, announced the raid and justified the Operation
on, amongst other grounds, the killing of Kapuuo and Toivo Shiyagaya.70 In a late-night
broadcast on the South African Broadcasting Corporation, which first broke news of the raid
to the public, Geldenhuys stated:
On March 27 two terrorists assassinated the leader of the Herero people, Mr Clemens Kapuuo.
The attack took place at his home in Katatura just a short while after hè and his tribal council
decided on asking the Administrator-General for better protection of the political leaders of
South West Africa. Before his death Mr Kapuuo was a strong supporter of the total destruction
of terrorist bases across the Angolan border.71
Following Operation Reindeer, the SADF presence became more pronounced than ever
before and the further militarisation of Namibia continued with the introduction of
conscription for Namibians.72
Covert Operations
The emphasis was more placed on disruption by means of indirect means of getting the enemy
to kill itself, to detain itself and to disrupt itself. And physically killing them was placed more
or less ... [a]s a last resort, soit of method. (Former CCB operative before the TRC).73
After 1975, South African paramilitary personnel, some of whom had served in Rhodesia,
honed their skills in counter-insurgency warfare in Namibia. Military units, such as 32
Battalion, which was established in 1976, were a home for former FNLA fighters
from Angola as well as African mercenaries,74 whilst Special Forces units, such as
68 Ibid., p. 39. For biographical details regarding Axel Johannes see, Pütz et al, Namibia Handbook, p. 279.
69 On the military history and triumphalist coverage, see for example http://www.netcentral.co.uk/~cobus/
CASSINGA.htm; M. Norval, Death in the Desert: The Namibian Tragedy (Washington, DC, Selous
Foundation Press, 1989); W. Steenkamp, Borderstrike (Cape Town, Butterworths, 1983); W. Steenkamp, South
Africa's Border War: 1966-1989 (Gibraltar, Ashanti Publishing, 1989).
70 TRC, volume. 2, Chapter 2, §41.
71 Du Pisani, SWA/Namibia, p. 393. Interview conducted with Jannie Geldenhuys in Pretoria, 3 July 2000.
72 Cited in, Heywood, Cassinga Event, p. 92. It must be remembered that at the time in SADF parlance 'terrorist'
was shorthand for SWAPO.
73 J. Geldenhuys, Die Wat Wen: 'n Generaal se Storie Uit 'n Era van Oorlog en Vrede, (Pretoria, J. L. van
Schalk, 1993), p. 53.
74 TRC, volume 2, chapter 3, §226. Evidence before the Commission also suggests that, in some instances, the
security forces were able to arrange for killings to be conducted by a third party.
75 TRC, volume 4, chapter 8, §56. 32 Battalion, often referred to as the 'Buffalo Battalion', was created in 1976
by Colonel Jan Breytenbach. It largely comprised black soldiers and contained many foreign mercenaries. lts
operational strength was approximately 1,500. The officers commanding 32 Battalion were Colonel J. D.
'Jannie' Breytenbach (1976-1977); Colone! G. J. Nel (1977-1978); Colonel Deon Ferreira (1978-1983);
Colonel E. G. Viljoen (1984-1988); and Colonel M. B. Delport (1988-1993). P. Stiff, The Silent War: South
African Recce Operations, 1969-1994 (Alberton, Galago Publishing Company, 1999), pp. 191-196.
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l Reconnaissance Regiment, were also home to professional, black African soldiers, äs
opposed to conscripts.75 However, those soldiers who were considered most successful, in
terms of 'Kill-rates' were the hunter-killer units set up in 1979, known as Koevoet
(Crowbar). An integral aspect of this murderous Organisation was the use of turned SWAPO
combatants known äs Askaris.76 Koevoet was originally set up in imitation of the Rhodesian
Selous Scouts:
... which specialised in 'pseudo-operations', a technique learned from British forces in Malaya
and Kenya and the Portuguese flechas or irregulär police troops in Mozambique and Angola.
The Selous Scouts, using black troopers disguised as nationalist guerrillas, operated in enemy
territory, capturing and interrogating guerrillas and using the intelligence gathered to launch an
immediate surprise attack. After such an act of treachery, a captive could not return to his
guerrilla Organisation but could now be induced himself to become a Selous Scout, by which
time he had been definitively 'turned'. Such 'turned' guerrillas were called Askaris, a Swahili
word acquired by British forces in the Mau Mau insurgency and transmitted via Rhodesian
officers to the South African Police.77
The Directorate of Special Tasks (DST) was set up in the mid-1970s specifically in
response to the independence of Angola.78 The officer commanding Special Forces was
directly responsible to the Chief of the SADF, bypassing normal channels of command.79
In addition, 'all sensitive Special Forces operations were vetted by the Minister of Defence
and in the case of particularly sensitive operations, by the State President' .80
In the first days of early March 1978, Katutura was struck by a wave of increasingly
violent clashes - allegedly between SWAPO and DTA supporters. Calls for a major military
Operation (later to be known äs Operation Reindeer - see above) can be first traced coming
from the CSOPS (Chief of Staff Operations) on 27 February, which coincides with the
outbreak of troubles in Windhoek.81 On 8 March 1978, Lieutenant General Constand
Viljoen defined his targets; shortly thereafter, planning for Operation Reindeer was
approved. This, in turn, coincides with the ending of unrest in Windhoek.82
The original operational orders for Operation Reindeer indicate the extent to which the
South African military created incidents and manipulated populär opinion in ways that were
beneficial to its perceived interests:
76 TRC, volume 2, chapter 3, § 50. l Reconnaissance Regiment (l RR) was based in Durban and consisted of
a training component and an operational wing which provided personnel for cross-border raids such äs those
on Matola and Maseru. In the 1980s it was a predominantly black unit with white senior officers, and with
a strength of approximately 1,000. Officers commanding l RR were Commandant J. G. 'Jannie' Breytenbach
(1972-1975); Major (T/Cmdt) J. C. Swart (1975-1981); Colonel E. Olckers (1981-1983); Colonel A. Bestbier
(1983-1988); and Colonel G. Keulder (1988- ).
77 TRC, volume 2, chapter 2, § 103, 'After the formation of Koevoet, it became Standard practice to "persuade"
captured guerrillas to "turn" and become askaris assisting Koevoet in the conflict against their former
comrades. This was a practice pioneered by the Rhodesian Selous Scouts, the archetypal model for Koevoet
and the unit within which most of Koevoet's founding members had learnt their counter-insurgency skills.
There is considerable evidence that the process of "turning" was accompanied by torture and that the price of
non-compliance was summary execution. Once "turned", these askaris and other Koevoet members are said to
have carried out atrocities while disguised as SWAPO fighters in order to discredit the liberation movement,
as the Selous Scouts had done during the Rhodesian war'.
78 Ellis, JSAS, 24, 2 (1998), pp. 267-8.
79 TRC, volume 2, chapter 3, § 42. DST was a highly clandestine Operation. Details of the command structure
of DST in its early days are sketchy but it is known that then Colonel (later Major-General) Marius Oelschig
was the commanding officer of DST's Field Office in Rundu from December 1978 to 1982.
80 TRC, volume 2, chapter 3, § 49. From its inception and until the early 1990s, the GOCs Special Forces were
Major-General F. W. Loots (1974-1982); Major-General A. J. Liebenberg (1982-1985); Major-General A. J.
M Joubert (1985-1989); and Major-General E. Webb (1989-1991).
81 TRC, volume 2, chapter 3, § 48.
82 TRC, volume 2, chapter 2, § 21. 'Wilde Nag in Katatura', Die Suidwester, l March 1978.
83 TRC, volume 2, chapter 2, § 24-26. See Die Republikein, 22 March 1978 detailing the funeral of Julius
Kambirongo, who had been killed in early March.
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phase two: beginning D-7: The key idea should be to create the Impression of a resumption of
SWAPO border violations and attacks on SADF patrols, especially against the local population.
The intention would be after a relatively quiet period to refocus attention representing it as a
seasonal trend. Shortly before D-1, information should be released on a SWAPO build-up.
Thereafter, on D minus l, a grave incident (real or imaginary) must take place. Either
attempted assassination or cross-border attack on SADF patrol base. In the case of the latter,
some casualties could be attributed to this attack; ...83
The operational orders clearly indicate that the SADF was not above creating incidents and
manipulating the true cause of death of its own soldiers. Particularly disturbing, in the light
of the above, are the contents of an undated message from SWA Command to the Chief
of the Army accompanying the operational orders found by the TRC:
Contingency plans in progress to create own incidents that can be attributed to SWAPO should
insufficient publicity or further SWAPO actions be forthcoming.84
In other words, in March 1978 the SADF, or more particularly DST, was involved in a
project designed to cause support for the SADF's intention to expand its role in Angola and
Namibia.
Kapuuo was killed on Easter Monday, 27 March, and buried on 9 April. On Ascension
day, less than a month later, South African forces launched Operation Reindeer, the largest
combined Operation carried out by South African forces since the Second World War. In
the event, the killing of Clemens Kapuuo was one of the 'incidents' used by the SADF in
its justification for the raid on Kassinga.85
South Africa and the Killing of Kapuuo
Whilst much of the history of the liberation struggle in Namibia still remains under-re-
searched and unwritten it seems that a strong argument can be made that South African
operatives were responsible for the killing of Clemens Kapuuo.
Windhoek in 1978 had a total population of under 200,000 people, of whom 150,000
would have been black. It is probable that there were no more than 5,000 motor vehicles
registered in Windhoek at the time. Very few of these vehicles would have been Chevrolet
Custom pick-ups and even fewer would have been blue with wrought iron bars. The inquest
papers make no mention of any attempt to tracé the vehicle that was used - a vehicle which,
given its size and cost, would have been noticed had it been abandoned, burnt or simply
transferred to another part of the territory.
No firearms were ever recovered, although a recovered bullet casing was sent to Pretoria
for ballistic analysis and comparison.86 According to the report contained in the inquest, the
casing was compared with the casings received earlier, and a negative result was reached.
We know from the affidavit of the Senior Medical Superintendent in the state hospital
in Windhoek, Dr David J. Parsons, that the South African security police were involved in
investigating the assassination. Parsons addressed his affidavit detailing the certification of
Kapuuo's death to 'Security Police' Windhoek. Yet none of the security police's findings
is included in the docket.
Although Kapuuo clearly had been murdered, the inquest docket indicates that the
inquest findings were 'returned for filing' by the chief clerk of the Attorney-General and
were not submitted to a judge, let alone to a judge of the supreme court.
84 TRC, volume 2, chapter 2, § 27. Italics added.
85 Ibid. § 28.
86 Du Pisani, SWA/Namibia, p. 391.
87 It is interesting that the bullet was handed over into the custody of the captain of a regulär SAA flight 744
in Windhoek, to be personally handed over in Johannesburg.
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At the time of the TRC (Truth and Reconciliation Commission), former SADF officers
set up the South African Defence Force Contact Bureau.87 In dealing with Operation
Reindeer, the SADF Contact Bureau 's Analysis of the TRC Report stated that Lieutenant
General Viljoen noted in a memorandum to the Chief of the SADF, General Magnus Malan,
that Kassinga base was involved in 'The planning, control and co-ordination, including the
intelligence function of operations against SWA'.88 According to the TRC Report one of the
priorities of Operation Reindeer was to ensure that 'Documents as well as useful weapons
were to be removed'.89 Col. C. J. Nöthling has noted of Operation Reindeer in his Military
Chronicle of South West Africa (1915-1988) that 'A large quantity of equipment and
supplies were destroyed and valuable documents seized. The loss of trained personnel and
the effect of the information obtained by the security forces was a serious setback for
SWAPO'.90 The TRC report cited a message sent by SWA Tactical HQ at the time of the
raid on Kassinga, which stated inter alia that 'A large number of documents were seized
in the OC's house'.91
Thus, it would seem that one of the main objectives of the Operation, the seizure of
documents, was achieved. Given the above, if SWAPO had been involved in the execution
of Clemens Kapuuo, the planning, intelligence, coordination and so forth would have been
executed from Kassinga base. In addition, given the success of Operation Reindeer, it is
more than likely that SADF troops would have captured documents relating to the
assassination of Kapuuo. However, these documents, if any were captured, were not
revealed at the time. Letters and enquiries addressed to the former generals Viljoen and
Geldenhuys in 2000, did lead to interviews, but failed to bring to light any of the documents
that allegedly proved SWAPO's involvement in the killing of Kapuuo. Geldenhuys did state
in an interview in 2000 that, on the eve of Namibian independence, documents relating to
the murder of Kapuuo were offered to Dirk Mudge, chairman of the DTA, by General
Willie Meyer, the SADF general 'in charge of closing shop'. Geldenhuys stated that Mudge
turned down the offer, on the grounds that the documents would be dismissed as
propaganda.92 Nevertheless, the Windhoek Observer regularly prints extracts from docu-
ments allegedly captured during Operation Reindeer, which the newspaper's editor claims
to have in his possession.93
In Summing Up
The assassination of Clemens Kapuuo was used in part by the SADF as justification for the
launching of Operation Reindeer, which heralded the renewed overt involvement of South
Africa in southern Angola. Operation Reindeer effectively scuttled any possibility of
Namibian independence being attained through the five nations proposal that had been
accepted by Vorster on 25 April. Instead Namibian independence came to be delayed for
another ten years as South African securocrats sought to socially engineer Namibia into
88 Comprising a panel of the four former chiefs of the SA Defence Force, generals Malan, Viljoen, Geldenhuys,
Meiring, and WOl's Holliday and Röhrbeck, and the convenor Maj. Gen. Marais.
89 SADF Contact Bureau's Analysis of the TRC Report, § 109.
90 TRC, volume 2, chapter. 2, § 26.
91 http://www.rhodesia.myweb.nl/swatf.htm
92 TRC, volume 2, chapter 2, § 38.
93 Interviews conducted with General Geldenhuys in Pretoria, during May and July of 2000.
94 'Recalling the Murder of a Son of the Soil', 25 March 2000, and 'Did South Africans Kill Clemens Kapuuo?',
2 September 2000, both in The Windhoek Observer.
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something more to their liking. During this period, Namibian society came to be highly
militarised. The South African proxy army, the South West African Territorial Force, was
established and compulsory conscription was introduced for all male Namibians south of
the 'Red Line'.94 The war became highly ethnicised; packaged as a war between Ovambo
'terrorists' and other Namibians within the various ethnic units of SWATF.
The assassination and the blame for the assassination, which was placed upon SWAPO,
were used to justify the South African security forces' crackdown on SWAPO activists still
living within Namibia. Kapuuo's assassination ensured that many Herero came to support
the DTA en masse. The perception that SWAPO had killed Kapuuo effectively ended any
form of dialogue that may have existed between SWAPO and large sections of the Herero
population.
Conclusion
If the killing of Kapuuo was a covert South African Operation, it was a gamble, but one
which paid off. It seems possible that the assassination of Kapuuo was one of the 'incidents'
mentioned prior to the launch of Operation Reindeer in the undated memo from SWA
Command to the Chief of the Army. This referred to 'contingency plans in progress to
create own incidents'.95 Operation Reindeer not only scuttled Namibian independence, but
it also destroyed any possible overt western support that Vorster's regime might have hoped
to have gained from his policy of détente and a possible form of Namibian 'independence'.
The leaking by military intelligence of information that led to 'Muldergate' and the
'information scandal', sealed the fates of Vorster and his henchmen.96 Vorster's days were
numbered. Henceforth, P. W. Botha and his securocrats would come to determine southern
African politics.
Conspiracies are not the usual haunt of academie historians, who should certainly
refrain from becoming involved in such theories. By nature, conspiracy theories
defy refutation. Nevertheless, the evidence emerging from the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission as well as the recent trial of Dr Basson have given increased
credibility to the incredible.97 In this article, a case has been made for the involvement
of elements of the South African Defence Force in the killing of Clemens Kapuuo.
This view stands in direct contrast to the claim that SWAPO was responsible for his
killing.98 In this, the article mirrors the work recently completed by Luise White on the
95 The 'Red Line' separates Northern Namibia from the commercial farming districts of Namibia. The 'Red Line'
was originally instituted in 1896 as a veterinary precaution, but has evolved into a border separating the
'communal' areas of Namibia from the commercial areas.
96 TRC, volume 2, chapter 2, § 28.
97 Frankel, Pines and Swilling, Resistance and Change, p. 5.
98 During the trial of Dr Wouter Basson, the former head of the SADF's covert chemical and biological weapons
Programme, the prosecution charged that between 1981 and 1988 more than 200 SWAPO members were
poisoned and then dumped into the sea from an aircraft. According to the indictment, this was done to relieve
'overpopulation' in an internment camp. '200 Swapo detainees were "dumped in sea'", The Namibian, 10
August 1999. H. E. Purkitt and S. F. Burgess, 'South Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programmes:
a Historica! and International Perspective', in Journal of Southern African Studies, 28, 2 (2002), pp. 229-253.
99 There are other views as to what happened: people have also argued that Kapuuo was killed on account of the
power struggles within the DTA or within Herero society itself. In early August 2000, the author and Casper
Erichsen conducted an interview with Chief Kuaima Riruako in the parliament buildings in Windhoek. In the
course of the interview, which dealt primarily with Riruako's activities in exile, hè stated that Katuutire Kaura,
current president of the DTA, the erstwhile official Opposition in Namibia, had been in Jamba, the UNITA
stronghold in southern Angola, shortly after the killing of Kapuuo. According to Riruako, Kaura had told him
that the South Africans had hired a UNITA hit team in Jamba to assassinate Kapuuo. He also alleged that that
this hit team had been flown in and out of Windhoek by the SADF. For his part, Kaura has refused to comment
on Riruako's allegations. Interview conducted with Riruako in Windhoek, 21 August 2000.
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assassination of Herbert Chitepo. In the case of Chitepo there have been four confessions
to the killing and at least as many accusations. As with the assassination of Chitepo, it is
possible that we will never know who killed Kapuuo. In the absence of a systematic history
of the liberation struggle, it seems as though the struggle will remain fertile ground for
conspiracy theorists for many years to come.
JAN-BART GEWALD
African Studies Centre, University of Leiden, PO Box 9555, 2300BC Leiden, The Nether-
lands. E-mail: gewald@fsw.leidenuniv.nl
